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traditional medical criteria of triage. Seattle appears to have been the only patient selection
committee to evaluate prospective patientsexplicitly in terms ofa utilitarian standard of"social
worth"; it was the only committee to have become embroiled in public controversy.2 Thus the
moral of the early dialysis crisis would seem to be that health professionals selecting patients
according to an "old" medical principle, triage, were able to allocate scarce resources with few
problems, while committees on which lay members introduced non-medical selection criteria,
like "social worth", became embroiled in controversy. It is only by forgetting about the 192
non-controversial committees, and about lay participation on the Seattle Committee, that
Jonsen can tell his taleofthefailure of"old" medical ethics and theconcomitant search for a new
bioethic.
To vex Jonsen with facts, however, is to commit what philosophers call a "category mistake".
Johnson is not aiming at academic history but aggadah. He isolates,juxtaposes, and embellishes
to illuminate, to reveal, to inspire-and he does so brilliantly.
Robert Baker, Union College, Schenectady
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, Strangers at the bedside: ahistoryofhow law andbioethicstransformed
medical decisionmaking, New York, Basic Books, 1991, pp. xi, 303, $24.95 (0-465-08209-2).
David Rothman, author ofthe Discovery ofthe asylum, has written the first social history of
the bioethical revolution: how it came about that "outsiders, not doctors, defined the moral
codes that were to guide physician behavior" (p. 4). The revolution wasprecipitated,during and
after World War II, by the extensive governmental funding ofhospital-based research, and the
increasing social distance between hospital-based physicians and their patients. The first
conflated the physician-patient with the science-subject relationship, the second tempted some
physician-scientists to advance science (and their careers) by treating patients as subjects
(generating scandals at Sloan-Kettering, the U.S. Public Health Service, Willowbrook and
elsewhere).
Coincidentally, new medical technologies attracted public attention to the problem of excess
demand for heart and, especially, kidney transplants. Traditional medical ethics offered few
answers to the problem ofallocating scarce organs. So, to bufferexternal criticism, the medical
community set up lay allocation committees-and in the process, allowed outsiders into
medicine. A similar buffering process occurred in medical research, where review committees
(known as IRBs) were set up to protect "patients" rights in the aftermath ofscandals. Allowing
select professional ousiders, the bioethicists (lawyers, philosophers, and theologians concerned
with medical ethics), to serve on oversight committees was thus the price the medicalprofession
willingly paid to securepublic and governmentfinancing, whileshielding itspractices from more
pervasive public and particularly political scrutiny.
Rothman's focus is on persons and events. Thus "change", that is the bioethical revolution,
"beganwith awhistle-blowerand a scandal" (p. 15). Thescandal,usingpatients asunconsenting
guinea pigs; the whistle-blower, Harvard anaesthesiologist, Henry Beecher-whose 1966 New
EnglandJournal ofMedicine article described twenty-two cases ofpublished research in which
human subjects were abused. Why did Beecher "blow the whistle"? Rothman emphasizes
Beecher's fear that "bad ethics would undercut the pursuit ofgood science" (p. 72). He barely
mentions the world-wide debate over codes of experimentation engendered by the 1949
Nuremberg trial of Nazi physicians and the subsequent 1954 and 1964 codes of the World
Medical Association-or Beecher's adamant opposition to the 1963 Harvard regulations on
research.
2A. H. Katz, and D. M. Proctor, Social-psychological characteristics ofpatients receiving hemodialysis
treatmentfor chronicrenalfailure, Public Health Service, Kidney Disease Program, Washington D. C.,July
1969; quoted in Renee Fox and Judith Swazey, The courage tofail: a social view oforgan transplants and
dialysis, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 228 ff.
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Social history, especially ofbioethics, is bound to be problematic unless it is predicated upon a
clear analysis of the substantive ethical issues. At issue in the 1960s was whether research
standards should be subjective guidelines, enforced by the researcher's conscience, externally
enforced objective rules, or intersubjective standards enforced by review committees (IRBs). In
a series of papers published both before and after 1966, Beecher argued that subjective
standards were too weak, objective standards too inflexible, and (citing Percival's 1803 code)
championed intersubjective external review. By highlighting only Beecher's 1966 article,
Rothman transforms a scholarly contribution to ain on-going policy debate into an isolated act
of "whistle-blowing". He thus transubstantiates Beecher, an archetypical "insider", into an
honorary "outsider", in order to substantiate his theory of bioethics as essentially an outside
critique.
Rothman systematically de-emphasizes substantive ethical debates within the medical
community, and obscures the role of physicians, of insiders, of traditional medical ethics, in
reshaping the ethics ofcontemporary medicine. None the less, he has written a penetrating and
ground-breaking history of contemporary medical ethics.
Robert Baker, Union College, Schenectady
JOSEPH S. FRUTON, A skeptical biochemist, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard
University Press, 1992, pp. xii, 330, £23.95 (0-674-81077-5).
With this richly informative, challenging and beautifully-written book, the American
proteolytic enzyme chemist, biochemistry textbook writer and historian, J. S. Fruton (b. 1912),
completes what can now be seen as a trilogy ofimportant historical studies. Molecules andlife
(New York, Wiley, 1972) examined the development of research on enzymes, proteins, nucleic
acids and biological oxidation from their nineteenth-century origins to the 1940s. In Contrasts
in scientifc style (Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1990) Fruton examined how
different styles of leadership affected biochemical research (and, incidentally, provided
historians of chemistry and biochemistry with a major work of reference). Echoing Robert
Boyle's Sceptical chymist (1661) and Joseph Needham's Sceptical biologist (1929), Fruton's
latest book critically (and sceptically) examines the philosophy and historiography of
biochemistry. The linking thread of all three volumes, and the main thrust of A skeptical
biochemist, is the interplay between biology and chemistry in the life sciences.
Although never as disenchanted with the current scientific world as his colleague, Erwin
Chargaff, Fruton has several axes to grind against philosophers and historians ofbiology who
conceive ideas more important than practice, who take an anti-reductionist position or who
view institutional factors as inhibiting and directing research. In five chapters, Fruton
examines: the "scientific method" of biochemists (dismissing Popper's and Medawar's
interpretation and making a plea for inductivism); methodological controversies since 1800
over vitalism and mechanism, organicism and reductionism; the rival interpretations of the
discipline's historical development (including a penetrating discussion of the issue of science
history versus history of science); and provides a fascinating analysis of the significance of
language and the changing meaning of words in biochemistry's development (including a
defence of the scientific paper against Medawar's claims offraudulence). In its wealth of case
histories based upon the author's close familiarity with the sources or on personal experience
since the early 1930s, Fruton makes a convincing case that historians and philosophers of
science must never undervalue the role of "craft" (and particularly the chemical techniques of
purification and structure determination) as well as instrumental improvements in their
interpretations. In its underscoring ofthe long and continuing significance ofchemistry in the
study of biological problems, Fruton's study will be of particular interest to historians of
chemistry, as well as to the audience of historians and philosophers ofbiology and practising
scientists that it chiefly addresses. There is also an excellent 44 page bibliography.
W. H. Brock, University of Leicester
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